Topic：A Leader-follower Controlled Markov Stopping Game for DT-ORS-Networks Time：2016年6月21日（周二）下午14:30-15:30 Venue：信电大楼-215学术厅 Speaker：Huaiyu Dai, Associated Professor                    Electrical and Computer Engineering                    North Carolina State University ，USA

Biography：

Huaiyu Dai (M’03, SM’09) received the B.E. and M.S. degrees in electrical engineering from Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, in 1996 and 1998, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from Princeton University, Princeton, NJ in 2002.

He was with Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies, Holmdel, NJ, during summer 2000, and with AT&T Labs-Research, Middletown, NJ, during summer 2001. Currently he is a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at NC State University, Raleigh. His research interests are in the general areas of communication systems and networks, advanced signal processing for digital communications, and communication theory and information theory. His current research focuses on networked information processing and crosslayer design in wireless networks, cognitive radio networks, wireless security, and associated information-theoretic and computation-theoretic analysis. 

He has served as an editor of IEEE Transactions on Communications, Signal Processing, and Wireless Communications. Currently he is an Area Editor in charge of wireless communications for IEEE Transactions on Communications. He co-edited two special issues of EURASIP journals on distributed signal processing techniques for wireless sensor networks, and on multiuser information theory and related applications, respectively. He co-chairs the Signal Processing for Communications Symposium of IEEE Globecom 2013, the Communications Theory Symposium of IEEE ICC 2014, and the Wireless Communications Symposium of IEEE Globecom 2014.

Abstract：

In various resource sharing networks, opportunistic resources with dynamic quality are often present for the users to exploit. As many user tasks are delay-tolerant, this favorably allows the network users to wait for and access the opportunistic resource at the time of its best quality. For such delay-tolerant and opportunistic resource sharing networks (DTORS-Networks), the resource accessing strategies developed in literature suffer from three limitations: Firstly, they mainly focused on single-user scenarios whereas the competition from other users is ignored. Secondly, the influence from the resource seller who may take actions to manipulate the resource sharing procedure is not considered. Thirdly, the impact of the actions from both the network users and the resource seller on the resource quality dynamics is not considered either. To overcome these limitations, a leader-follower controlled Markov stopping game (LF-C-MSG) is developed in this work. The derived Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy of the LF-C-MSG can be used to guide the behaviors of both the network users and the resource seller for better performance and resource utilization efficiency. Two exemplary applications of the proposed LF-CMSG are presented, along with corresponding numerical results to verify the effectiveness of the proposed framework.